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Abstract
This paper investigates a class of mixed stochastic linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) social optimization and Nash game in
the context of a large scale system. Two types of interactive agents are involved: a major agent and a large number of weakly-
coupled minor agents. All minor agents are cooperative to minimize the social cost as the sum of their individual costs, whereas
such social cost are conflictive to that of major agent. Thus, major agent and all minor agents are further competitive to reach
some non-zero Nash equilibrium. The control processes enter both diffusion and drift terms of all major and minors’ states. This
extends the standard setup in which control only enters the drift terms, and such extension brings more modeling difference
and technical difficulties, in particular, when dealing with the feedback decentralized strategy via Riccati equation and mean-
field consistency condition (CC) representation. Applying the mean-field approximations and person-by-person optimality, we
obtain auxiliary control problems for major agent and minor agents, respectively. The decentralized social strategy is derived
by a class of new CC system, which is mean-field forward-backward stochastic differential equations. The well-posedness of
the CC system is obtained by the discounting method. The related asymptotic social optimality for minor agents, and Nash
equilibrium for major-minor agents are also verified.
Key words: Decentralized control; LQG mean-field strategy; Mean-field forward backward stochastic differential equations;
Nash equilibrium; Social-optimality.
1 Introduction
Mean-field games for large-population system have been
extensively studied recently. Themost significant feature
of a large-population system is the existence of consider-
able insignificant agents whose dynamics and cost func-
tionals are interrelated via the state-average. Although
the effect of an individual agent on the overall popula-
tion scale is negligible, the effects of their statistical be-
haviors cannot be ignored at the population scale. The
central goal of the individual agents is to obtain decen-
tralized strategies based on limited information of the
individual agent since it is unrealistic for a given agent
to obtain all other agents’ information when the number
of agents is sufficiently high. One efficient approach is
the mean-field games method which enables us to obtain
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the decentralized strategies through the limiting auxil-
iary control problem and the related consistency condi-
tion (CC) system. Along this direction, the interested
readers are referred to [12] and [15] for the derivation
of mean-field games, [3], [8], [10] for linear-quadratic-
Gaussian (LQG) mean-field games, [5] for probabilistic
analysis inmean-field games, [17] for risk-sensitivemean-
field games, [16] for discrete-time mean-field games. In
the basic mean-field decision model, all agents have com-
parably small influence. However, in some real models
there exist an agent that has a significant influence on
other agents. Thus a modified framework is to introduce
a major agent interacting with a large number of minor
agents. [11] considered LQG games with a major player
and a large number of minor players. [18] studies large
population dynamic games involving nonlinear stochas-
tic dynamical systems with a major agent and N minor
agents. [4] studied two-person zero-sum stochastic dif-
ferential games, in which one player is a major one and
the other player is a group of N minor agents which
are collectively playing, statistically identical, and have
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the same cost functional. [9] considered LQG mean-field
games with a major agent and considerable heteroge-
neous minor agents where the individual admissible con-
trols are constrained in closed convex subsets.
The agents in all aforementioned works are competitive,
i.e., all agents have their individual costs thus they are
non-cooperative to aim some (asymptotic) Nash non-
zero equilibrium. On the other hand, dynamic coopera-
tive multi-agent decision problems have also been well
studied in literature due to their theoretical analysis in-
terests and real application potentials. [13] studied a
class of LQG control problems with N decision-makers,
where the basic objective is to minimize a social cost as
the sum ofN individual costs containing mean-field cou-
pling. [24] investigated social optima of mean-field LQG
control models with Markov jump parameters. [2] con-
sidered LQG mean-field team-optimal problem by as-
suming mean-field sharing for a given population sizeN ,
which gives an optimal control problem with special par-
tial state information. [14] studied an LQG mean-field
control problem involving a major player and a large
number of minor players, where the objective is to op-
timize a social cost as a weighted sum of the individ-
ual costs under decentralized information. For other re-
search and applications of cooperative mean-field con-
trol problems, interested readers are referred to [1], [6],
[7], [19], [21], [23], [25] and the references therein.
In this paper, we will investigate a new class of stochastic
LQGoptimization problems involving a major agent and
a large number of weakly-coupled minor agents. Specif-
ically, the minor agents are cooperative to minimize the
social cost as the sum of individual cost, while the major
agent and minor agents are competitive aiming for Nash
equilibrium in nonzero-sum game manner. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first time to study such kind
of problem. In the mean-field game, the major agent and
all the minor agents are competitive so as to achieve to
a Nash equilibrium; while in social optimal problems,
all the agents are cooperative to find the social optimal
strategies. Besides the new framework, our study also
has other new features. For instance, in the state equa-
tions of the major agent and minor agents, the control
process enters the drift and diffusion coefficients both.
In our study, the problem can be solved in the follow-
ing way. Firstly, for the major agent, we freeze the state
average as a deterministic term. Thus, the major auxil-
iary control problem can be obtained. By the result in
[26], the major auxiliary LQG optimal control can be de-
rived, which depends on the frozen mean-field term. Sec-
ondly, for the minor agents, under the person-by-person
optimality principle, by applying variational techniques
and introducing some mean-field terms, the original mi-
nor social optimization problem can also be converted to
an auxiliary LQG control problem which can be solved
using some traditional scheme in [26] as well. Thirdly,
to determine the frozen mean-field terms, we construct
the CC system by some fixed-point analysis. The mean
filed terms can be obtained by solving the CC system,
while the solvability of the CC system can be determined
through the discounting method. Last, by using some
asymptotic analysis and standard estimation of stochas-
tic differential equations (SDEs), we show that themean-
field strategies really brings us a ”good” approximation
(i.e., the optimal loss tend to 0 when the population N
tends to infinity).
Moreover, the innovative aspects of the obtained results
in this paper are as follows: Firstly, the state process and
state average enter the diffusion terms. This brings many
difficulties when we apply the variational method to ob-
tain the minor auxiliary control problem. In particular,
N +1 additional adjoint processes should be introduced
to deal with the cross-terms in the cost functional vari-
ation. Secondly, since the additional backward adjoint
processes are introduced, the convergence of the aver-
age of backward stochastic differential equations (BS-
DEs) should be studied when we estimate the optimal
loss of the mean-field games strategies. Thirdly, the con-
trol process enters the diffusion terms. Because of this,
the adapted term will enter the drift term of the CC sys-
tem. This also brings difficulties when we study the solv-
ability of the CC system. We cannot obtain a forward-
backward ordinary differential equations (FBODEs) sys-
tem by taking expectation on the CC system directly as
usual. What we obtain is a mean-field forward-backward
stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) system and
the limiting state average is represented in an embed-
ding way. To its well-posedness, we deal with it by some
discounting method.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: In
Section 2, we give the formulation of the mixed LQG so-
cial optima problem. In Section 3 and Section 4, we use
the mean-field approximation and person-by-person op-
timality to find the auxiliary control problem of the ma-
jor agent and minor agents, respectively. The CC system
is derived in Section 5. Meanwhile, the well-posedness of
CC system is also established. In Section 6, we obtain the
asymptotic optimality of the decentralized strategies.
2 Problem formulation
Consider a finite time horizon [0, T ] for fixed T > 0.
Assume that (Ω,F , {Ft}0≤t≤T ,P) is a complete filtered
probability space satisfying the usual conditions and
{Wi(t), 0 ≤ i ≤ N}0≤t≤T is an (N + 1)-dimensional
Brownian motion on this space. Let Ft be the filtration
generated by {Wi(s), 0 ≤ i ≤ N}0≤s≤t and augmented
by NP (the class of all P-null sets of F). Let FW0t , FWit
and F it be the augmentation of σ{W0(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t},
σ{Wi(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t} and σ{W0(s),Wi(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t} by
NP respectively.
Let 〈·, ·〉 denotes standard Euclidean inner product and
2
‖ · ‖ denotes the norm. x⊤ denotes the transpose of a
vector (or matrix) x. M ∈ Sn denotes the set of sym-
metric n×n matrices with real elements.M > (≥)0 de-
notes thatM ∈ Sn which is positive (semi)definite, while
M ≫ 0 denotes that, for some ε > 0, M − εI ≥ 0. We
introduce the following spaces for any given Euclidean
space H. They will be used in the paper:
• LFT (Ω;H) := {η : Ω → H|η is FT -measurable,
E|η|2 <∞},
• L2Ft(0, T ;H) := {ζ(·) : [0, T ] × Ω → H|ζ(·) is Ft-
progressively measurable, E
∫ T
0
|ζ(·)|2dt <∞}.
• L∞(0,T ;H) := {ζ(·) : [0,T ]→ H|esssup0≤s≤T |ζ(s)| <
∞}.
• L2Ft(Ω;C(0, T ;H)) := {ζ(·) : [0, T ] × Ω → H|ζ(·) is
Ft-adapted, continuous, E(sup0≤s≤T |ζ(s)|2) <∞}.
We consider a weakly coupled large population system
with a major agent A0 and N individual minor agents
denoted by {Ai : 1 ≤ i ≤ N}. The dynamics of the
N + 1 agents are given by a system of linear stochastic
differential equations with mean-field coupling:
dx0(t) =
[
A0(t)x0(t) +B0(t)u0(t) + F0(t)x
(N)(t)
]
dt
+
[
C0(t)x0(t) +D0(t)u0(t) + F˜0(t)x
(N)(t)
]
dW0(t),
x0(0) = ξ0 ∈ Rn,
(1)
and for 1 ≤ i ≤ N,

dxi(t) =
[
A(t)xi(t) +B(t)ui(t) + F (t)x
(N)(t)
]
dt
+
[
C(t)xi(t)+D(t)ui(t)+F˜ (t)x
(N)(t)+G˜(t)x0(t)
]
dWi(t),
xi(0) = ξ ∈ Rn,
(2)
where x(N)(t) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 xi(t) is the average state of the
minor agents.
Remark 1 We remark that the control process and
state-average enter both the drift and diffusion terms.
This makes our paper different to standard mean-field
game (e.g., [23]) or social optimization (e.g., [13]) liter-
ature in which only drift terms are control-dependent.
Let u(·) := (u0(·), u1(·), · · · , uN (·)) be the set of strate-
gies of all N +1 agents, u−0(·) := (u1(·), · · · , uN(·)) and
u−i(·) := (u0(·), · · · , ui−1(·), ui+1(·), · · · , uN(·)), 0 ≤
i ≤ N . The centralized admissible strategy set is given
by
Uc :=
{
u(·)|u(t) is adapted to Ft,E
∫ T
0
|u(t)|2dt<∞
}
.
Corresponding, the decentralized admissible strategy set
for the major agent is given by
U0 :=
{
u0(·)|u0(t) is adapted to σ
{
FW0t ∪ σ{x0(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t}
}
,
E
∫ T
0
|ui(t)|2dt <∞
}
,
and the decentralized admissible strategy set for the ith
minor agent is given by
Ui :=
{
ui(·)|ui(t) is adapted to σ
{
FWit ∪ σ{xi(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t}
}
,
E
∫ T
0
|ui(t)|2dt <∞
}
.
For simplicity, define
U−0 := {(u1(·), · · · , uN (·))|ui(·) ∈ Ui, i = 1, · · · , N}.
The cost functional for A0 is given by
J0(u0(·), u−0(·))
=
1
2
E
∫ T
0
[〈
Q0(t)(x0(t)−H0(t)x(N)(t)), x0(t)−H0(t)x(N)(t)
〉
+
〈
R0(t)u0(t), u0(t)
〉]
dt,
(3)
and the cost functional for Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , is given by
Ji(ui(·), u−i(·))
=
1
2
E
∫ T
0
[〈
Q(t)(xi(t)−H(t)x0(t)− Hˆ(t)x(N)(t)),
xi(t)−H(t)x0(t)−Hˆ(t)x(N)(t)
〉
+
〈
R(t)ui(t), ui(t)
〉]
dt.
(4)
Remark 2 It is worth pointing out that it brings no
essential difficulty to introduce a terminal cost term in
(3) and (4). This will only change the terminal value of
the associated Riccati equations. Thus, for simplicity, we
only consider Lagrange type cost functional here.
The aggregate team cost of N minor agents is
J (N)soc (u(·)) =
N∑
i=1
Ji(ui(·), u−i(·)). (5)
We impose the following assumptions on the coefficients:
(H1) A0(·), F0(·), C0(·), F˜0(·), A(·), F (·), C(·), F˜ (·),
G˜(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rn×n),
B0(·), D0(·), B(·), D(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rn×m).
(H2) Q0(·), H0(·), Q(·), H(·), Hˆ(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ; Sn),
R0(·), R(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ; Sm).
Remark 3 Under (H1), the system (1) and (2)
admits a unique strong solution (x0, · · · , xN ) ∈
L2Ft(Ω;C(0, T ;R
n)) × · · · × L2Ft(Ω;C(0, T ;Rn)) for
any given admissible control (u0, · · · , uN ) ∈ Uc × · · ·
× Uc. Under (H2), the cost functionals (3) and (4) are
well defined.
Note that while the coefficients are dependent on the
time variable t, in what follows the variable t will usually
be suppressed if no confusion would occur. We propose
the following social optimization problem:
Problem 4 Find a decentralized strategy set u¯(·)=(u¯0(·),
u¯1(·), · · · , u¯N (·)) where u¯i(·) ∈ Ui, 0 ≤ i ≤ N , such that
J0(u¯0(·), u¯−0(·)) = inf
u0∈U0
J0(u0(·), u¯−0(·)),
J (N)soc (u¯0(·), u¯−0(·)) = inf
u−0∈U−0
J (N)soc (u¯0(·), u−0(·)).
(6)
3
3 Auxiliary optimal control problem of the ma-
jor agent
Replacing x(N)(·) of (1) and (3) by xˆ(·) which will be
determined in Section V, the limiting major agent’s state
is given by
dz0 =
(
A0z0 +B0u0 + F0xˆ
)
dt
+
(
C0z0 +D0u0 + F˜0xˆ
)
dW0,
z0(0) = ξ0,
(7)
and correspondingly the limiting cost functional is
J0(u0(·)) = 1
2
E
∫ T
0
[
〈Q0(z0−H0xˆ), z0−H0xˆ〉+〈R0u0, u0〉
]
dt.
(8)
We define the following auxiliary stochastic optimal con-
trol problem for major agent:
Problem 5 For major agent A0, minimize J0(u0(·))
over U0.
This is a standard linear quadratic stochastic control
problem. For its solvability, one can introduce the fol-
lowing standard assumption
(SA) Q0(·) ≥ 0, Q(·) ≥ 0, R0(·)≫ 0, R(·)≫ 0.
By [22], we have the following result:
Proposition 6 Under (H1)-(H2) and (SA), the follow-
ing Riccati equation
− (P0B0 + C⊤0 P0D0)(R0 +D⊤0 P0D0)−1(B⊤0 P0 +D⊤0 P0C0)+
P˙0 + P0A0 +A
⊤
0 P0 + C
⊤
0 P0C0 +Q0 = 0,
P0(T ) = 0,
(9)
admits a unique strongly regular solution P0(·), and Prob-
lem 5 admits a unique feedback optimal control u¯0 =
Θ1z¯0 +Θ2, where{
Θ1 = −(R0+D⊤0 P0D0)−1(B⊤0 P0+D⊤0 P0C0),
Θ2 = −(R0+D⊤0 P0D0)−1(B⊤0 φ+D⊤0 ζ+D⊤0 P0F˜0xˆ),
(10)
and φ satisfies
dφ = −
{[
A⊤0 − (P0B0 + C⊤0 P0D0)(R0 +D⊤0 P0D0)−1B⊤0
]
φ
+
[
C⊤0 − (P0B0 + C⊤0 P0D0)(R0 +D⊤0 P0D0)−1D⊤0
]
ζ
+
[
C0
⊤−(P0B0+C⊤0 P0D0)(R0+D⊤0 P0D0)−1D⊤0
]
P0F˜0xˆ
+ P0F0xˆ−Q0H0xˆ
}
dt+ ζdW0,
φ(T ) = 0.
(11)
The corresponding optimal state is
dz¯0 =
[
(A0 +B0Θ1)z¯0 +B0Θ2 + F0xˆ
]
dt
+
[
(C0 +D0Θ1)z¯0 +D0Θ2 + F˜0xˆ
]
dW0,
z0(0) = ξ0.
(12)
4 Stochastic optimal control problem for minor
agents
4.1 Person-by-person optimality
Replace x0 of (2) and (4) by z0. Let (u¯1(·), · · · , u¯n(·))
be centralized optimal strategies of the minor agents.
We now perturb ui(·) and keep u¯−i(·)=(u¯0(·), u¯1(·),
· · · , u¯i−1(·), u¯i+1(·), · · · , u¯N(·)) fixed. For j = 1, · · · , N ,
denote the perturbation δuj(·) = uj(·) − u¯j(·),
δxj(·) = xj(·) − x¯j(·), δx(N) = 1N
∑N
j=1 δxj(·),
δJj = Jj(ui(·), u¯−i(·)) − Jj(u¯i(·), u¯−i(·)). Therefore,
the variation of the state for Ai is given by
dδxi =
[
Aδxi +Bδui + Fδx
(N)
]
dt
+
[
Cδxi +Dδui + F˜ δx
(N) + G˜δx0
]
dWi,
δxi(0) = 0,
and for Aj , j 6= i,
dδxj =
[
Aδxj + Fδx
(N)
]
dt
+
[
Cδxj + F˜ δx
(N) + G˜δx0
]
dWj ,
δxj(0) = 0,
and the variation of the state for A0 is given by{
dδx0 =
[
A0δx0 + F0δx
(N)
]
dt+
[
C0δx0 + F˜0δx
(N)
]
dW0,
δx0(0) = 0.
Define δx−(0,i) :=
∑N
j=1,j 6=i δxj and
dδx−(0,i) =
[
Aδx−(0,i) + F (N − 1)δx(N)
]
dt
+
∑
j 6=i
[
Cδxj + F˜ δx
(N) + G˜δx0
]
dWj ,
δx−(0,i)(0) = 0.
By some elementary calculations, we can further obtain
the variation of the cost functional of Ai as follows
δJi = E
∫ T
0
[
〈Q(x¯i − Hˆx¯(N) −Hx¯0), δxi − Hˆδx(N) −Hδx0〉
+ 〈Ru¯i, δui〉
]
dt.
For j 6= i, the variation of the cost functional of Aj is
given by
δJj = E
∫ T
0
〈Q(x¯j − Hˆx¯(N) −Hx¯0), δxj − Hˆδx(N) −Hδx0〉dt.
Therefore, the variation of the social cost satisfies
4
δJ (N)soc =E
∫ T
0
[
〈Q(x¯i−Hˆx¯(N)−Hx¯0), δxi−Hˆδx(N)−Hδx0〉
+
∑
j 6=i
〈Q(x¯j−Hˆx¯(N)−Hx¯0), δxj−Hˆδx(N)−Hδx0〉
+ 〈Ru¯i, δui〉
]
dt.
(13)
Replacing x¯(N) in (13) by the mean-field term xˆ,
δJ (N)soc = E
∫ T
0
[
〈Qx¯i, δxi〉 −
〈
Q(Hˆxˆ+Hx¯0)
+ HˆQ(xˆ− Hˆxˆ−Hx¯0), δxi
〉
− 〈HˆQ(xˆ− Hˆxˆ−Hx¯0), δx−(0,i)〉
− 〈HQ(xˆ− Hˆxˆ−Hx¯0), Nδx0〉
+
1
N
∑
j 6=i
〈
Q(x¯j − Hˆxˆ−Hx¯0), Nδxj
〉
+ 〈Ru¯i, δui〉
]
dt+
4∑
l=1
εl,
where
ε1 = E
∫ T
0
〈(QHˆ − HˆQHˆ)(xˆ− x¯(N)), Nδx(N)〉dt,
ε2 = −E
∫ T
0
〈HQHˆ(xˆ− x¯(N)), NHδx0〉dt,
ε3 = E
∫ T
0
〈HQ(xˆ− x¯(N)), Nδx0〉dt,
ε4 = E
∫ T
0
〈HˆQ(xˆ− x¯(N)), Nδx(N)〉.
(14)
Introduce the limiting processes x∗0, x
∗
j , x
∗∗ to replace
Nδx0, Nδxj , δx−(0,i) respectively, where
dx∗0 =
[
A0x
∗
0 + F0δxi + F0x
∗∗
]
dt
+
[
C0x
∗
0 + F˜0δxi + F˜0x
∗∗
]
dW0, x
∗
0(0) = 0,
dx∗j =
[
Ax∗j + Fδxi + Fx
∗∗
]
dt
+
[
Cx∗j+F˜ δxi+F˜x
∗∗+G˜x∗0
]
dWj , x
∗
j (0)=0,
dx∗∗ =
[
Ax∗∗ + Fδxi + Fx∗∗
]
dt, x∗∗(0) = 0.
(15)
Therefore,
δJ (N)soc = E
∫ T
0
[
〈Qx¯i, δxi〉 − 〈Q(Hˆxˆ+Hx¯0)
+ HˆQ(xˆ− Hˆxˆ−Hx¯0), δxi〉
− 〈HˆQ(xˆ− Hˆxˆ−Hx¯0), x∗∗〉
− 〈HQ(xˆ− Hˆxˆ−Hx¯0), x∗0〉
+
1
N
∑
j 6=i
〈Q(x¯j − Hˆxˆ−Hx¯0), x∗j 〉
+ 〈Ru¯i, δui〉
]
dt+
7∑
l=1
εl,
where
ε5=E
∫ T
0
〈HˆQ(xˆ−Hˆxˆ−Hx¯0), x∗∗−δx−(0,i)〉dt,
ε6=E
∫ T
0
〈HQ(xˆ−Hˆxˆ−Hx¯0), x∗0−Nδx0〉dt,
ε7=E
∫ T
0
1
N
∑
j 6=i
〈Q(x¯j−Hˆxˆ−Hx¯0), Nδxj−x∗j 〉dt.
(16)
Replacing x¯0 by z0, we have
δJ (N)soc =E
∫ T
0
[
〈Qx¯i, δxi〉−〈Q(Hˆxˆ+Hz0)+HˆQ(xˆ−Hˆxˆ
−Hz0), δxi〉−〈HˆQ(xˆ−Hˆxˆ−Hz0), x∗∗〉
−〈HQ(xˆ−Hˆxˆ−Hz0), x∗0〉+
1
N
∑
j 6=i
〈Q(x¯j
−Hˆxˆ−Hz0), x∗j 〉+〈Ru¯i, δui〉
]
dt+
10∑
l=1
εl,
(17)
where
ε8 = E
∫ T
0
〈QH(z0 − x¯0) + HˆQ(z0 − x¯0)
+ HˆQH(x¯0 − z0), x∗∗〉dt,
ε9 = E
∫ T
0
〈HQH(x¯0 − z0), x∗0〉dt,
ε10 = E
∫ T
0
1
N
∑
j 6=i
〈QH(z0 − x¯0), x∗j 〉dt.
(18)
Now we introduce the following adjoint equations y01 ,
y
j
1 and y2
dy01 =
[
HQ(xˆ− Hˆxˆ−Hz0)−A⊤0 y01 − C⊤0 β01
− G˜E[βjj1 |FW0t ]
]
dt+ β01dW0, y
0
1(T ) = 0,
dy
j
1 =
[
−Q(x¯j − Hˆxˆ−Hz0)−A⊤yj1 − C⊤βjj1
]
dt
+ βjj1 dWj +
∑
k 6=j
β
jk
1 dWk, y
j
1(T ) = 0,
dy2 =
[
HˆQ(xˆ−Hˆxˆ−Hz0)−F⊤E[yj1|FW0t ]−F˜⊤E[βjj1 |FW0t ]
−F˜⊤E[βjj1 |FW0t ]−(A+F )⊤y2−F⊤0 y01 − F˜⊤0 β01
]
dt
+ β02dW0, y2(T ) = 0, j = 1, · · · , N,
to replace the terms x∗0, x
∗
j and x
∗∗ respectively. Apply-
ing Itoˆ’s formula to 〈yj1, x∗j 〉, we have
0 =E〈yj1(T ), x∗j (T )〉 − E〈yj1(0), x∗j (0)〉
=E
∫ T
0
[
〈−Q(x¯j − Hˆxˆ−Hz0), x∗j 〉+ 〈F⊤yj1 + F˜ βjj1 , x∗∗〉
+ 〈G˜βjj1 , x∗0〉+ 〈F⊤yj1 + F˜⊤βjj1 , δxi〉
]
dt.
(19)
Similarly, we have
5
0 =E〈y2(T ), x∗∗(T )〉 − E〈y2(0), x∗∗(0)〉
=E
∫ T
0
[
〈HˆQ(xˆ−Hˆxˆ−Hz0)−F⊤E[yj1|FW0t ]
− F˜⊤E[βjj1 |FW0t ]− F⊤0 y01 − F˜⊤0 β01 , x∗∗〉
+ 〈F⊤y2, δxi〉
]
dt,
(20)
and
0 =E〈y01(T ), x∗0(T )〉 − E〈y01(0), x∗0(0)〉
=E
∫ T
0
[
〈HQ(xˆ− Hˆxˆ−Hz0)− G˜E[βjj1 |FW0t ], x∗0〉
+ 〈F⊤0 y01 + F˜⊤0 β01 , x∗∗〉+ 〈F⊤0 y01 + F˜⊤0 β01 , δxi〉
]
dt.
(21)
By adding (19), (20) and (21) to (17), we have
δJ (N)soc = E
∫ T
0
[
〈Qx¯i, δxi〉 − 〈Q(Hˆxˆ+Hz0)
+ HˆQ(xˆ− Hˆxˆ−Hz0)− F⊤y2
− F⊤E[yj1|FW0t ]− F˜⊤E[βjj1 |FW0t ]− F⊤0 y01
− F˜⊤0 β01 , δxi〉+ 〈Ru¯i, δui〉
]
dt+
12∑
l=1
εl,
where
ε11=E
∫ T
0
〈
F⊤
( 1
N
∑
j 6=i
y
j
1−E[yj1|FW0t ]
)
+ F˜⊤
( 1
N
∑
j 6=i
β
jj
1 −E[βjj1 |FW0t ]
)
, x∗∗
〉
dt,
ε12=E
∫ T
0
G˜
( 1
N
∑
j 6=i
β
jj
1 −E[βjj1 |FW0t ]
)
, x∗0〉dt,
ε13=E
∫ T
0
〈
F⊤
( 1
N
∑
j 6=i
y
j
1−E[yj1|FW0t ]
)
+ F˜⊤
( 1
N
∑
j 6=i
β
jj
1 −E[βjj1 |FW0t ]
)
, δxi
〉
dt.
(22)
Therefore, we introduce the decentralized auxiliary cost
functional variation δJi as follows
δJi = E
∫ T
0
[
〈Qx¯i, δxi〉−〈Q(Hˆxˆ+Hz0)+HˆQ(xˆ−Hˆxˆ−Hz0)
− F⊤y2 − F⊤yˆ1 − F˜⊤βˆ1 − F⊤0 y01 − F˜⊤0 β01 , δxi〉
+ 〈Ru¯i, δui〉
]
dt.
(23)
4.2 Decentralized strategies
Motivated by (23), one can introduce the following aux-
iliary problem:
Problem 7 Minimize Ji(ui) over ui ∈ Ui where
dxi =
(
Axi +Bui + F xˆ
)
dt
+
(
Cxi +Dui + F˜ xˆ+ G˜z0
)
dWi, xi(0) = x,
Ji(ui) =
1
2
E
∫ T
0
[
〈Qxi, xi〉 − 2〈S, xi〉+ 〈Rui, ui〉
]
dt,
(24)
and
S =Q(Hˆxˆ+Hz0) + HˆQ(xˆ−Hˆxˆ−Hz0)−F⊤y2−F⊤yˆ1
−F˜⊤βˆ1−F⊤0 y01−F˜⊤0 β01 .
The mean-field terms xˆ, z0, y2, yˆ1, βˆ1, y
0
1 , β
0
1 will be
determined by the CC system in Section V. From [22],
we have the following result:
Proposition 8 Under (H1)-(H2) and (SA), the follow-
ing Riccati equation

P˙ + PA+A⊤P + C⊤PC +Q
− (PB + C⊤PD)(R+D⊤PD)−1(B⊤P +D⊤PC) = 0,
P (T ) = 0,
(25)
admits a unique strongly regular solution P (·), and Prob-
lem 7 admits a unique feedback optimal control u¯i =
Λ1x¯i + Λ2, where{
Λ1 = −(R+D⊤PD)−1(B⊤P +D⊤PC),
Λ2 = −(R+D⊤PD)−1(B⊤ϕ+D⊤η +D⊤P (F˜ xˆ+ G˜z0)),
(26)
and (ϕ, η) satisfies
dϕ = −
{
[A⊤ − (PB + C⊤PD)(R +D⊤PD)−1B⊤]ϕ
+ [C⊤ − (PB + C⊤PD)(R+D⊤PD)−1D⊤]η
+ [(PB + C⊤PD)(R +D⊤PD)−1D⊤ − C⊤]
× P (F˜ xˆ+ G˜z0) + PF xˆ− S
}
dt+ ηdW0,
ϕ(T ) = 0.
(27)
5 Consistency condition
Because of the symmetric and decentralized character,
we only need a generic Brownian motion (still denoted
by W1) which is independent of W0 to characterize the
CC system.
Proposition 9 The undetermined quantities in Prob-
lem 5, 7 can be determined by (xˆ, z0, y
0
1, β
0
1 , yˆ1, βˆ1,
y2)=(E[z|FW0t ], z0, yˇ0, βˇ1, E[yˇ1|FW0t ], E[βˇ1|FW0t ], yˇ2),
where (z, z0, yˇ0, βˇ1, yˇ1, βˇ1, yˇ2) is the solution of the fol-
lowing mean-field FBSDEs:
6

dz0 =
[(
A0−B0R−10 (B⊤0 P0 +D⊤0 P0C0)
)
z0 −B0R−10 B⊤0 φˇ
−B0R−10 D⊤0 ζˇ +
(
F0 − B0R−10 D⊤0 P0F˜0
)
E[z|FW0t ]
]
dt
+
[(
C0 −D0R−10 (B⊤0 P0 +D⊤0 P0C0)
)
z0
−D0R−10 B⊤0 φˇ−D0R−10 D⊤0 ζˇ
+
(
F˜0 −D0R−10 D⊤0 P0F˜0
)
E[z|FW0t ]
]
dW0,
dz =
[(
A−BR−1(B⊤P +D⊤PC)
)
z −BR−1D⊤PG˜z0
−BR−1B⊤ϕˇ−BR−1D⊤ˇη+
(
F−BR−1D⊤PF˜
)
E[z|FW0t ]
]
dt
+
[(
C−DR−1(B⊤P+D⊤PC)
)
z+
(
G˜−DR−1D⊤G˜
)
z0
−DR−1B⊤ϕˇ−DR−1D⊤ηˇ
+
(
F˜ −DR−1D⊤PF˜
)
E[z|FW0t ]
]
dW1,
dyˇ0 =
[
−HQHz0 +HQ(I − Hˆ)E[z|FW0t ]−A⊤0 yˇ0
− C⊤0 βˇ0 − G˜E[βˇ11 |FW0t ]
]
dt+ βˇ0dW0,
dyˇ1 =
[
QHz0 −Qz +QHˆE[z|FW0t ]−A⊤yˇ1 − C⊤βˇ11
]
dt
+ βˇ01dW0 + βˇ
1
1dW1,
dyˇ2 =
[
− HˆQHz0 + HˆQ(I − Hˆ)E[z|FW0t ]− F⊤E[yˇ1|FW0t ]
−F˜⊤E[βˇ11 |FW0t ]−(A+F )⊤yˇ2−F0⊤yˇ0−F˜0⊤βˇ0
]
dt+βˇ2dW0,
dφˇ = −
{[
A0
⊤−(P0B0+C0⊤P0D0)R−10 B⊤0
]
φˇ
+
[
C0
⊤−(P0B0 +C0⊤P0D0)R−10 D⊤0
]
ζˇ
−
[
(P0B0+C0
⊤P0D0)R−10 D⊤0−C0⊤
]
P0F˜0E[z|FW0t ]
+P0F0E[z|FW0t ]−Q0H0E[z|FW0t ]
}
dt+ ζˇdW0,
dϕˇ = −
{[
A⊤−(PB+C⊤PD)R−1B⊤
]
ϕˇ+
[
C⊤−(PB+C⊤PD)R−1D⊤
]
ηˇ
+
[
(PB+C⊤PD)R−1D⊤−C⊤
]
PG˜z0
+
(
F−
[
(PB+C⊤PD)R−1D⊤−C⊤
]
PF˜
)
E[z|FW0t ]−S
}
dt+ηˇdW0,
z0(0) = ξ0, z(0) = ξ, yˇ0(T ) = 0, yˇ1(T ) = 0,
yˇ2(T ) = 0, φˇ(T ) = 0, ϕˇ(T ) = 0,
(28)
with R = R +D⊤PD and R0 = R0 +D⊤0 P0D0.
Define X = (z⊤0 , z
⊤)⊤, Y = (yˇ⊤0 , yˇ
⊤
1 , yˇ
⊤
2 , φˇ
⊤, ϕˇ⊤)⊤,
Z1=(βˇ
⊤
0 , βˇ
0T
1 , βˇ
⊤
2 , ζˇ
⊤, ηˇ⊤)⊤, Z2=(0⊤, βˇ1T1 , 0
⊤, 0⊤,
0⊤)⊤, Z = (Z1, Z2) and W = (W⊤0 ,W
⊤
1 )
⊤, the mean-
field FBSDEs (28) take the following form:

dX =
[
A1X+A¯1E[X |FW0t ]+B1Y +F1Z1
]
dt
+
[
C
0
1X+C¯
0
1E[X |FW0t ]+D01Y +F01Z1
]
dW0
+
[
C
1
1X+C¯
1
1E[X |FW0t ]+D11Y +F11Z1
]
dW1,
dY =
[
A2X+A¯2E[X |FW0t ]+B2Y +B¯2E[Y |FW0t ]
+C2Z1+C¯2E[Z1|FW0t ]
]
dt+Z1dW0+Z2dW1,
X(0) = (ξ⊤0 , ξ
⊤)⊤, Y (T ) = (0⊤, 0⊤, 0⊤, 0⊤, 0⊤)⊤,
(29)
where
A1 =
(
A0−B0R−10 (B⊤0 P0+D⊤0 P0C0) 0
−BR−1D⊤PG˜ A−BR−1(B⊤P+D⊤PC)
)
,
A¯1 =
(
0 F0−B0R−10 D⊤0 P0F˜0
0 F−BRD⊤PF˜
)
,B1 =
(
0 0 0 −B0R−10 B⊤0 0
0 0 0 0 −BRB⊤
)
,
F1 =
(
0 0 0 −B0R−10 D⊤0 0
0 0 0 0 −B0R−10 D⊤
)
,
F
0
1 =
(
0 0 0 −D0R−10 D⊤0 0
0 0 0 0 0
)
, C¯01 =
(
0 F˜0−D0R−10 D⊤0 P0F˜0
0 0
)
,
C
0
1 =
(
C0−D0R−10 (B⊤0 P0+D⊤0 P0C0) 0
0 0
)
,
C
1
1 =
(
0 0
G˜−DR−1D⊤G˜ C−DR−1(B⊤P+D⊤PC)
)
,
C¯
1
1 =
(
0 0
0 F˜−DR−1D⊤PF˜
)
,D01 =
(
0 0 0 −D0R−10 B⊤0 0
0 0 0 0 0
)
,
D
1
1 =
(
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −DR−1B⊤
)
,F11 =
(
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −DR−1D⊤
)
,
A2 =

−HQH 0
QH −Q
−HˆQH 0
0 0[
(PB+C⊤PD)R−1D⊤−C⊤
]
PG˜ 0
 ,
A¯2 =

0 HQ(I−Hˆ)
0 QHˆ
0 HˆQ(I−Hˆ)
0 A¯′
2
0 A¯′′
2
 ,B2 =

−A⊤
0
0 0 0 0
0 −A⊤ 0 0 0
−F⊤
0
0 −(A+F )⊤ 0 0
0 0 0 B′
2
0
0 0 0 0 B′′
2
 ,
A¯
′
2 =
[
(P0B0 + C
⊤
0 P0D0)R−10 D⊤0 − C⊤0
]
P0F˜0 − P0F0 +Q0H0,
A¯
′′
2 = −F +
[
(PB + C⊤PD)R−1D⊤ − C⊤
]
PF˜ ,
B
′
2 = −A⊤0 + (P0B0 + C⊤0 P0D0)R−10 B⊤0 ,
B
′′
2 = −A⊤ + (PB + C⊤PD)R−1B⊤,
B¯2 =
( 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 −F˜ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
)
, C¯2 =
 0 −G˜ 0 0 00 0 0 0 0
0 −F˜⊤ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
 ,
C2 =

−C⊤
0
0 0 0 0
0 −C⊤ 0 0 0
−F˜⊤
0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 aa 0
0 0 0 0 C′′
2
 ,
C
′
2 = −
[
C⊤0 − (P0B0 + C⊤0 P0D0)R−10 D⊤0
]
,
C
′′
2 = −
[
C⊤ − (PB + C⊤PD)R−1D⊤
]
.
We will use discounting method to study the global solv-
ability of FBSDE (29). To start, we first give some re-
sults for general nonlinear forward-backward system:
dX(t)=b
(
t,X(t),E[X(t)|FW0t ], Y (t), Z(t)
)
dt
+σ
(
t,X(t),E[X(t)|FW0t ],Y (t), Z(t)
)
dW (t),
dY (t)=−f
(
t,X(t),E[X(t)|FW0t ], Y (t),E[Y (t)|FWtt ],
Z(t),E[Z(t)|FW0t ]
)
dt+ Z(t)dW (t),
X(0) = x, Y (T ) = 0,
(30)
where the coefficients satisfy the following conditions:
(A1) There exist ρ1, ρ2 ∈ R and positive constants
ki, i = 1, · · · , 12 such that for all t, x, x¯, y, y¯, z, z¯, a.s.,
(1) 〈b(t, x1, x¯, y, z) − b(t, x, x2, x¯, y, z), x1 − x2〉 ≤
ρ1|x1 − x2|2,
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(2) |b(t, x, x¯1, y1, z1)−b(t, x, x¯2, y2, z2)|≤k1|x¯1−x¯2|+
k2|y1 − y2|+ k3|z1 − z2|,
(3) 〈f(t, x, x¯, y1, y¯, z, z¯)− f(t, x, x¯, y2, y¯, z, z¯),
y1 − y2〉 ≤ ρ2|y1 − y2|2,
(4) |f(t, x1, x¯1, y, y¯1, z1, z¯1)− f(t, x2, x¯2, y, y¯2, z2,
z¯2)| ≤ k4|x1 − x2|+ k5|x¯1 − x¯2|+ k6|y¯1 − y¯2|
+k7|z1 − z2|+ k8|z¯1 − z¯2|,
(5) |σ(t, x1, x¯1, y1, z1)− σ(t, x2, x¯2, y2, z2)|2 ≤
k29 |x1−x2|2+k210|x¯1−x¯2|2+k211|y1−y2|2+k212|z1−
z2|2.
(A2)
E
∫ T
0
[
|b(t, 0, 0, 0, 0)|2 + |σ(t, 0, 0, 0, 0)|2
+ |f(t, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)|2
]
dt <∞.
(31)
Similar to [9] and [20], we have the following result of
solvability of (29). For the readers’ convenience, we give
the proof in the appendix.
Theorem 10 Suppose (A1) and (A2) hold. There ex-
ists a constant δ1 > 0 depending on ρ1, ρ2, T , ki, i
= 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 such that if ki ∈ [0, δ1), i = 2, 3,
4, 5, 11, 12, FBSDE (30) admits a unique adapted
solution (X,Y, Z) ∈ L2F(0, T ;Rn) × L2F(0, T ;Rm) ×
L2F(0, T ;R
m×d). Furthermore, if 2ρ1 + 2ρ2 < −2k1 −
2k6 − 2k27 − 2k28 − k29 − k210, there exists a constant
δ2 > 0 depending on ρ1, ρ2, ki, i = 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
such that if ki ∈ [0, δ2), i = 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 12, FBSDE
(30) admits a unique adapted solution (X,Y, Z) ∈
L2F(0, T ;R
n)× L2F(0, T ;Rm)× L2F(0, T ;Rm×d).
Let ρ∗1 and ρ
∗
2 be the largest eigenvalue of
1
2 (A1 + A
⊤
1 )
and 12 (B2+B
⊤
2 ), respectively. Comparing (30) with (29),
we can check that the parameters of (H3) and (H4) can
be chosen as follows:
k1 = ‖A¯1‖, k2 = ‖B1‖, k3‖F1‖, k4 = ‖A2‖,
k5 = ‖A¯2‖, k6 = ‖B¯2‖, k7 = ‖C2‖, k8 = ‖C¯2‖
k9 = ‖C01‖, k10 = ‖C¯01‖, k11 = ‖D01‖, k12 = ‖F 01 ‖.
Now we introduce the following assumption:
(H3) 2ρ∗1+2ρ
∗
2 < −2‖A¯1‖−2‖B¯2‖−2‖C2‖2−2‖C¯2‖2−‖C01‖2 − ‖C¯01‖2.
It follows from Theorem 10 that
Proposition 11 Under (H1)-(H3), there exists a con-
stant δ3 > 0 depending on ρ
∗
1, ρ
∗
2, ki, i = 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
such that if ki ∈ [0, δ3), i = 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 12, FBSDE
(29) admits a unique adapted solution (X,Y, Z) ∈
L2F(0, T ;R
n)× L2F(0, T ;Rm)× L2F(0, T ;Rm×d).
Thus, via Proposition 6, 8, 11, the following result can
be obtained straightforwardly and we omit its detailed
proof.
Theorem 12 Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA), the large-
population system (1), (2), (3) and (4) admits a unique
feedback form mean-field decentralized strategy set u˜(·)
= (u˜0(·), u˜1(·), · · · , u˜N (·)) where u˜0 = Θ1x˜0 + Θ2, u˜i =
Λ1x˜i + Λ2, for i = 1, · · · , N . x˜0 and x˜i are the realized
states satisfying
dx˜0 =
[
(A0+B0Θ1)x˜0+B0Θ2+F0x˜
(N)
]
dt
+
[
(C0+D0Θ1)x˜0+D0Θ2+F˜0x˜
(N)
]
dW0,
dx˜i =
[
(A+BΛ1)x˜i+BΛ2+F x˜
(N)
]
dt
+
[
(C+DΛ1)x˜i+DΛ2+F˜ x˜
(N)+G˜x˜0
]
dWi,
x˜0(0) = ξ0, x˜i(0) = ξ, 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
(32)
where x˜(N) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 x˜i. (Θ1,Θ2) and (Λ1,Λ2) are
given by (10) and (26) respectively. The mean-field terms
xˆ, z0, y2, yˆ1, βˆ1, y
0
1, β
0
1 in (10) and (26) are uniquely
determined by (28).
Through the discussion above, the mean-field decentral-
ized strategies have been characterized. In what follows,
its asymptotic optimality will be studied.
6 Asymptotic ε-optimality
Definition 13 A mixed strategy set {uεi ∈ Ui}Ni=0 is
asymptotic ε-optimal if there exists ε = ε(N) > 0,
limN→∞ ε(N) = 0 such that
J0(uε0, uε−0) ≤ inf
u0∈U0
J0(u0, uε−0) + ε,
and
1
N
(
J (N)soc (uε0, uε−0)− inf
u−0∈U−0
J (N)soc (uε0, u−0)
)
≤ ε,
where uε−0 := {uε1, · · · , uεN}.
Let u˜ be the mean-field strategies given by Theorem
12 and the realized decentralized states (x˜0, x˜1, · · · , x˜N )
satisfy (32) and x˜(N) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 x˜i. For u¯ = (u¯0, u¯1,· · · , u¯N ), the corresponding optimal states of auxiliary
problem are:
dx¯0 =
[
(A0 +B0Θ1)x¯0 +B0Θ2 + F0E[z|FW0t ]
]
dt
+
[
(C0 +D0Θ1)x¯0 +D0Θ2 + F˜0E[z|FW0t ]
]
dW0,
dx¯i =
[
(A+BΛ1)x¯i +BΛ2 + FE[z|FW0t ]
]
dt
+
[
(C +DΛ1)x¯i +DΛ2 + F˜E[z|FW0t ] + G˜x¯0
]
dWi,
x¯0(0) = ξ0, x¯i(0) = ξ, 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
where z is the solution of (28). Therefore, the optimal
control of Problem 5 is
u¯0 = Θ1x¯0 +Θ2.
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First, we need some estimations. In the proofs below, we
will useK to denote a generic constant whose value may
change from line to line.
Lemma 14 [9, Lemma 5.1] Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA),
there exists a constant K1 independent of N such that
sup
0≤i≤N
E sup
0≤t≤T
|x˜i(t)|2 ≤ K1.
Lemma 15 Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA), there exists a
constant K2 independent of N such that
E sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣x˜(N)(t)− E[z|FW0t ]∣∣∣2 ≤ K2N .
PROOF. It is easy to get that
d
(
x˜(N) − E[z|FW0t ]
)
=(A+BΛ1+F )
(
x˜(N) − E[z|FW0t ]
)
dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
(C+DΛ1)x˜i+DΛ2+F˜ x˜
(N)+G˜x˜0
]
dWi.
Therefore,
E sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣∣x˜(N)(s)− E[z|FW0s ]∣∣∣2
≤KE
∫ t
0
∣∣∣x˜(N) − E[z|FW0s ]∣∣∣2ds
+
K
N2
E sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣∣ ∫ s
0
N∑
i=1
[
(C +DΛ1)x˜i +DΛ2
+ F˜ x˜(N) + G˜x˜0
]
dWi
∣∣∣2.
By Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality, we have
E sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣∣x˜(N)(s)− E[z|FW0s ]∣∣∣2
≤KE
∫ t
0
∣∣∣x˜(N) − E[z|FW0s ]∣∣∣2ds
+
K
N2
E
∫ t
0
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣(C +DΛ1)x˜i +DΛ2 + F˜ x˜(N) + G˜x˜0∣∣∣2ds
≤KE
∫ t
0
∣∣∣x˜(N) − E[z|FW0s ]∣∣∣2ds
+
K
N
(
1 + sup
0≤i≤N
E sup
0≤t≤T
|x˜i(t)|2
)
.
Finally, it follows from Gronwall’s inequality, and
Lemma 14 that there exists a constant K2 independent
of N such that
E sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣x˜(N)(t)− E[z|FW0t ]∣∣∣2 ≤ K2N . ✷
Lemma 16 Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA), there exists a
constant K3 independent of N such that
sup
0≤i≤N
E sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣x˜i(t)− x¯i(t)∣∣∣2 ≤ K3
N
.
PROOF. It is easy to check that
d(x˜i − x¯i) =
[
(A+BΛ1)(x˜i − x¯i)+F (x˜(N)−E[z|FW0t ])
]
dt
+
[
(C+DΛ1)(x˜i−x¯i)+F˜ (x˜(N) − E[z|FW0t ])
+ G˜(x˜0 − x¯0)
]
dWi,
and
d(x˜0 − x¯0)
=
[
(A0 +B0Θ1)(x˜0 − x¯0) + F0(x˜(N) − E[z|FW0t ])
]
dt
+
[
(C0 +D0Θ1)(x˜0 − x¯0) + F˜0(x˜(N) − E[z|FW0t ])
]
dW0.
Therefore, it follows from Burkholder-Davis-Gundy in-
equality that
E sup
0≤s≤t
|x˜i(s)− x¯i(s)|2
≤KE
∫ t
0
[
|x˜i − x¯i|2 + |x˜(N) − E[z|FW0s ]|2
]
ds
+2Esup
0≤s≤t
∣∣∣∫ s
0
[
(C+DΛ1)(x˜i−x¯i)(r)+F˜ (x˜(N)(r)−E[z|FW0r ])
+ G˜(x˜0 − x¯0)(r)
]
dWi(r)
∣∣∣2
≤KE
∫ t
0
|x˜i−x¯i|2ds+KE
∫ t
0
[
|x˜(N)−E[z|FW0s ]|2+|x˜0 − x¯0|2
]
ds,
and
E sup
0≤s≤t
|x˜0(s)−x¯0(s)|2
≤KE
∫ t
0
[
|x˜0−x¯0|2 + |x˜(N)−E[z|FW0s ]|2
]
ds
+ 2E sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣∣ ∫ s
0
[
(C0 +D0Θ1)(x˜0−x¯0)(r)
+F˜0(x˜
(N)(r)−E[z|FW0r ])
]
dW0(r)
∣∣∣2
≤KE
∫ t
0
|x˜0−x¯0|2ds+KE
∫ t
0
∣∣∣x˜(N)−E[z|FW0s ]∣∣∣2ds.
Therefore, it follows from Gronwall’s inequality and
Lemma 15 that
sup
0≤i≤N
E sup
0≤t≤T
|x˜i(t)− x¯i(t)|2 ≤ K3
N
. ✷
Note that
d(x˜0 − z0)
=
[
(A0 +B0Θ1)(x˜0 − z0) + F0(x˜(N) − E[z|FW0t ])
]
dt
+
[
(C0 +D0Θ2)(x˜0 − z0) + F˜0(x˜(N) − E[z|FW0t ])
]
dW0.
Similar to the proof of Lemma 16, we have the following
result:
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Lemma 17 Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA), there exists a
constant K5 independent of N such that
E sup
0≤t≤T
|x˜0(t)− z0(t)|2 ≤ K5
N
.
6.1 Major agent
Lemma 18 Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA),∣∣∣J0(u˜0, u˜−0)− J0(u¯0)∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
).
PROOF. Recall (3) and (8), it follows from
J0(u˜0, u˜−0)− J0(u¯0)
=
1
2
E
∫ T
0
{〈
Q0(x˜0 −H0x˜(N)), x˜0 −H0x˜(N)
〉
−
〈
Q0(x¯0 −H0E[z|FW0t ]), x¯0 −H0E[z|FW0t ]
〉}
dt
=
1
2
E
∫ T
0
〈
Q0(x˜0 − x¯0 −H0(x˜(N) − E[z|FW0t ])),
x˜0 − x¯0 −H0(x˜(N) − E[z|FW0t ])
〉
dt
+ E
∫ T
0
〈
Q0(x˜0 − x¯0 −H0(x˜(N) − E[z|FW0t ])),
x¯0 −H0E[z|FW0t ]
〉
dt
≤KE
∫ T
0
[
|x˜0 − x¯0|2 + |x˜(N) − E[z|FW0t ]|2
]
dt
+K
∫ T
0
[
(E|x˜0 − x¯0|2) 12 + (E|x˜(N) − E[z|FW0t ]|2)
1
2
]
dt
=O
( 1√
N
)
. ✷
Let us consider the case that the major agent A0 uses
an alternative strategy u0 while for i = 1, · · · , N , the
minor agent Ai use the strategy u˜i. The realized states
with major agent’s perturbation are
dα0 =
[
A0α0+B0u0+F0α
(N)
]
dt
+
[
C0α0+D0u0+F˜0α
(N)
]
dW0,
dαi =
[
(A+BΛ1)αi+BΛ2+Fα
(N)
]
dt
+
[
(C+DΛ1)αi+DΛ2+F˜α
(N)+G˜α0
]
dWi,
α0(0) = ξ0, αi(0) = ξ, 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
where α(N) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 αi. The decentralized limiting
states with major agent’s perturbation are

dα¯0 =
[
A0α¯0+B0u0+F0E[z|FW0t ]
]
dt
+
[
C0α¯0+D0u0+F˜0E[z|FW0t ]
]
dW0,
dα¯i =
[
(A+BΛ1)α¯i+BΛ2+FE[z|FW0t ]
]
dt
+
[
(C+DΛ1)α¯i+DΛ2+F¯E[z|FW0t ]+G˜α¯0
]
dWi,
α¯0(0) = ξ0, α˜i(0) = ξ, 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
Similar to Lemma 15 and 16, we have
Lemma 19 Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA), there exists a
constant K6 independent of N such that
E sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣α(N)(t)− E[z|FW0t ]∣∣∣2 ≤ K6N .
Lemma 20 Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA), there exists a
constant K7 independent of N such that
sup
0≤i≤N
E sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣αi(t)− α¯i(t)∣∣∣2 ≤ K7
N
.
Thus, we have the following result.
Lemma 21 Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA), we have∣∣∣J0(u0, u˜−0)− J0(u0)∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
).
PROOF.
J0(u0, u˜−0)− J0(u0)
=
1
2
E
∫ T
0
{〈
Q0(α0 −H0α(N)), α0 −H0α(N)
〉
−
〈
Q0(α¯0 −H0E[z|FW0t ]), α¯0 −H0E[z|FW0t ]
〉}
dt
=
1
2
E
∫ T
0
〈
Q0(α0 − α¯0 −H0(α(N) − E[z|FW0t ])),
α0 − α¯0 −H0(α(N) − E[z|FW0t ])
〉
dt
+ E
∫ T
0
〈
Q0(α0 − α¯0 −H0(α(N) − E[z|FW0t ])),
α¯0 −H0E[z|FW0t ]
〉
dt
≤KE
∫ T
0
[
|α0 − α¯0|2 + |α(N) − E[z|FW0t ]|2
]
dt
+K
∫ T
0
[
(E|α0 − α¯0|2) 12 + (E|α(N) − E[z|FW0t ]|2)
1
2
]
dt
=O
( 1√
N
)
. ✷
Theorem 22 Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA), (Θ1,Θ2) is a
1√
N
-optimal strategy for the major agent.
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PROOF. It follows fromLemma 18 and Lemma 21 that
J0(u˜0, u˜−0) ≤ J0(u¯0) +O( 1√
N
) ≤ J0(u0) +O( 1√
N
)
≤ J0(u0, u˜−0) +O( 1√
N
). ✷
6.2 Minor agent
6.2.1 Representation of social cost
Rewrite the large-population system (1) and (2) as fol-
lows:
dx = (Ax+Bu)dt+
N∑
i=0
(Cix+Diu)dWi, x(0) = Ξ.
(33)
where
A =

A0
F0
N
F0
N
··· F0
N
0 A+ F
N
F
N
··· F
N
0 F
N
A+ F
N
··· F
N
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 F
N
F
N
··· A+ F
N
 ,x =
 x0x1...
xN
 ,
B =

B0 0 0 ··· 0
0 B 0 ··· 0
0 0 B ··· 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 ··· B
 , u =
 u0u1...
uN
 ,
C0 =

C0
F˜0
N
F˜0
N
··· F˜0
N
0 0 0 ··· 0
0 0 0 ··· 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 ··· 0
 ,D0 =

D0 0 0 ··· 0
0 0 0 ··· 0
0 0 0 ··· 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 ··· 0
 ,
Ci =
1
...
i+1
...
N+1

0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
F˜
N
··· F˜
N
F˜
N
+C F˜
N
··· F˜
N
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0
 ,
Di =
1
...
i+1
...
N+1

0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
0 ··· 0 D 0 ··· 0
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0
 ,Ξ =
 ξ0ξ...
ξ
 .
Similarly, the social cost takes the following form:
J (N)soc (u)
=
1
2
n∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
[〈
Q(xi −Hx0 − Hˆx(N)),
(xi −Hx0 − Hˆx(N))
〉
+〈Rui, ui〉
]
dt
=
1
2
E
∫ T
0
[
〈Qx,x〉+〈Ru, u〉
]
dt,
(34)
where
Q=

Q00 Q01 Q02 ··· Q0N
Q10 Q11 Q12 ··· Q1N
Q20 Q21 Q22 ··· Q2N
...
...
...
. . .
...
QN0 QN1 QN2 ··· QNN
 ,R=
 0 0 0 ··· 00 R 0 ··· 00 0 R ··· 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 ··· R
 ,
and for i = 1, · · · , N, j 6= i,
Q00 = NQ+ Hˆ
⊤QHˆ −QHˆ − Hˆ⊤Q,
Q0i = −Hˆ⊤QH +QH,
Qi0 = −HQHˆ +HQ,
Qii = Q+
1
N
(Hˆ⊤QHˆ −QHˆ − Hˆ⊤Q),
Qij =
1
N
(Hˆ⊤QHˆ −QHˆ − Hˆ⊤Q).
Next, by the variation of constant formula, the strong
solution of (33) admits the following representation:
x(t) =Φ(t)Ξ + Φ(t)
∫ t
0
Φ(s)−1
[
(B−
N∑
i=0
CiDi)u(s)
]
ds
+
N∑
i=0
Φ(t)
∫ t
0
Φ(s)−1Diu(s)dWi(s),
(35)
where
dΦ(t) = AΦ(t)dt+
N∑
i=0
CiΦ(t)dWi, Φ(0) = I.
Define the following operators
(Lu(·))(·) := Φ(·)
{∫ ·
0
Φ(s)−1
[
(B−
N∑
i=0
CiDi)u(s)
]
ds
+
N∑
i=0
∫ ·
0
Φ(s)−1DiudWi(s)
}
,
L˜u(·) := (Lu(·))(T ), ΓΞ(·) := Φ(·)Φ−1(0)Ξ, Γ˜Ξ := (ΓΞ)(T ).
Correspondingly, L∗ is defined as the adjoint operator of
Lw.r.t. the inner product 〈a, b〉 = E ∫ T0 〈b, a〉dt (referring
[26]). Given any admissible u, we can express x as follows
x(·) = (Lu(·))(·) + ΓΞ(·), x(T ) = L˜u(·) + Γ˜Ξ.
Hence, we can rewrite the cost functional as follows:
2J (N)soc (u) = E
∫ T
0
[
〈Qx,x〉+〈Ru, u〉
]
dt
= 〈L∗QLu(·), u(·)〉+2〈L∗QΓy(·), u(·)〉
+〈QΓy(·),Γy(·)〉+〈Ru, u〉
= 〈(L∗QL+R)u(·), u(·)〉+2〈L∗QΓy(·), u(·)〉
+〈QΓy(·),Γy(·)〉
:= 〈M2u(·), u(·)〉+2〈M1, u(·)〉+M0.
(36)
Note that, M2 is a self-adjoint positive semidefinite
bounded linear operator.
6.2.2 Minor agent’s perturbation
Let us consider the case that the minor agent Ai uses
an alternative strategy ui while the major agent and all
other minor agents Aj , j 6= i use the strategies u˜−i. The
realized states with the ith minor agent’s perturbation
are
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
dxˇ0 =
[
(A0+B0Θ1)xˇ0+B0Θ2+F0xˇ
(N)
]
dt
+
[
(C0+D0Θ1)xˇ0+D0Θ2+F˜0xˇ
(N)
]
dW0,
dxˇi =
[
Axˇi+Bui+F xˇ
(N)
]
dt
+
[
Cxˇi+Dui+F˜ xˇ
(N)+G˜xˇ0
]
dWi,
dxˇj =
[
(A+BΛ1)xˇj+BΛ2+F xˇ
(N)
]
dt
+
[
(C+DΛ1)xˇj+DΛ2+F˜ xˇ
(N)+G˜xˇ0
]
dWj ,
y0(0) = ξ0, yi(0) = ξ, 1 ≤ j ≤ N, j 6= i,
where xˇ(N) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 xˇi. Moreover, introduce the fol-
lowing system:
dl˜0 =
[
(A0 +B0Θ1)l˜0 +B0Θ2 + F0E[z|FW0t ]
]
dt
+
[
(C0 +D0Θ1)l˜0 +D0Θ2 + F˜0E[z|FW0t ]
]
dW0,
dl˜j =
[
(A+BΛ1)l˜j +BΛ2 + FE[z|FW0t ]
]
dt
+
[
(C +DΛ1)l˜j +DΛ2 + F˜E[z|FW0t ] + G˜z0
]
dWj ,
l˜0(0) = ξ0, l˜j(0) = ξ, 1 ≤ j ≤ N,
and
dlˇ0 =
[
(A0 +B0Θ1)lˇ0 +B0Θ2 + F0E[z|FW0t ]
]
dt
+
[
(C0 +D0Θ1)lˇ0 +D0Θ2 + F˜0E[z|FW0t ]
]
dW0,
dlˇi =
[
Alˇi +Bui + F lˇ
(N)
]
dt
+
[
Clˇi +Dui + F˜ lˇ
(N) + G˜z0
]
dWi,
dlˇj =
[
(A+BΛ1)lˇj +BΛ2 + FE[z|FW0t ]
]
dt
+
[
(C +DΛ1)lˇj +DΛ2 + F˜E[z|FW0t ] + G˜z0
]
dWj ,
lˇ0(0) = ξ0, lˇi(0) = lˇj(0) = ξ, 1 ≤ j ≤ N, j 6= i,
where l˜(N) =
∑N
i=1
1
N
l˜i and lˇ
(N) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 lˇi. Similar
to Lemma 14, we have
sup
0≤i≤N
E sup
0≤t≤T
|xˇi(t)|2 + sup
0≤i≤N
E sup
0≤t≤T
|l˜i(t)|2
+ sup
0≤i≤N
E sup
0≤t≤T
|lˇi(t)|2 ≤ K.
(37)
Similar to the computation in Section 4.1, we have
δJ (N)soc =E
∫ T
0
[
〈Qx˜i, δxi〉+ 〈Ru˜i, δui〉 −
〈
Q(Hˆxˆ+Hz0)
+HˆQ(xˆ−Hˆxˆ−Hz0)−F⊤y2−F⊤E[yj1|FW0t ]
−F˜⊤E[βjj1 |FW0t ]−F0⊤y01−F˜⊤0β01 , δxi
〉]
dt+
13∑
l=1
εl,
(38)
where ε1, · · · , ε13 are defined by (14), (16), (18) and (22).
Finally, we have
δJ (N)soc = E
∫ T
0
[
〈Ql˜i, δli〉 − 〈S, δli〉+ 〈Ru˜i, δui〉
]
dt+
15∑
l=1
εl,
(39)
where
ε14 = E
∫ T
0
[
〈Q(x˜i − l˜i), δxi〉+ 〈Ql˜i, xˇi − lˇi〉
− 〈Ql˜i, x˜i − l˜i〉
]
dt,
ε15 = E
∫ T
0
[
〈S, xˇi − lˇi〉 − 〈S, x˜i − l˜i〉
]
dt.
(40)
At the end of this subsection, we give some lemmas which
will be used in subsection 3).
Lemma 23 Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA), there exists a
constant K9 independent of N such that
E sup
0≤t≤T
|xˇ(N)(t)− E[z|FW0t ]|2 ≤
K9
N
. (41)
PROOF. Note that
dxˇ(N) =
[
(A+BΛ1)xˇ
(N) − 1
N
BΛ1xˇi +
1
N
Bui +
N − 1
N
BΛ2
+ F xˇ(N)
]
dt+
1
N
[
Cxˇi +Dui + F˜ xˇ
(N) + G˜xˇ0
]
dWi
+
1
N
∑
j 6=i
[
(C +DΛ1)xˇj +DΛ2 + F˜ xˇ
(N) + G˜xˇ0
]
dWj
=
[
(A+ F +BΛ1)xˇ
(N) +
1
N
B(ui − Λ1xˇi − Λ2)
+BΛ2
]
dt+
1
N
[
Cxˇi +Dui + F˜ xˇ
(N) + G˜xˇ0
]
dWi
+
1
N
∑
j 6=i
[
(C +DΛ1)xˇj +DΛ2 + F˜ xˇ
(N) + G˜xˇ0
]
dWj .
Thus,
d(xˇ(N) − E[z|FW0t ])
=
[
(A+F+BΛ1)(xˇ
(N) − E[z|FW0t ])
+
1
N
B(ui − Λ1xˇi − Λ2)
]
dt
+
1
N
[
Cxˇi+Dui+F˜ xˇ
(N)+G˜xˇ0
]
dWi
+
1
N
∑
j 6=i
[
(C+DΛ1)xˇj+DΛ2+F˜ xˇ
(N)+G˜xˇ0
]
dWj .
By Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality, we have
12
E sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣∣xˇ(N)(s)− E[z|FW0s ]∣∣∣2
≤KE
∫ t
0
[∣∣∣xˇ(N) − E[z|FW0s ]∣∣∣2+ 1N2 sup0≤j≤N |xˇj |2
+
1
N2
|ui|2+ 1
N
]
ds
+
K
N2
E sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣∣ ∫ s
0
[
Cxˇi+Dui+F˜ xˇ
(N)+G˜xˇ0
]
dWi
∣∣∣2
+
K
N2
E sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣∣∑
j 6=i
∫ s
0
[
Cxˇj+D(Λ1x˜j+Λ2)+F˜ xˇ
(N)
+G˜xˇ0
]
dWj
∣∣∣2
≤KE
∫ t
0
|xˇ(N) − E[z|FW0s ]|2ds+O
( 1
N
)
.
Finally, it follows from Gronwall’s inequality that
E sup
0≤t≤T
|xˇ(N)(t)− E[z|FW0t ]|2 ≤
K9
N
. ✷
By Lemma 15, Lemma 17 and Lemma 23, we have
Lemma 24 Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA), there exist con-
stants K10, K11, K11 independent of N such that
E sup
0≤t≤T
|xˇ0(t)− z0(t)|2 ≤ K10
N
, (42)
and
sup
0≤j≤N
E sup
0≤t≤T
|xˇj(t)− lˇj(t)|2 ≤ K11
N
, (43)
and
sup
0≤j≤N
E sup
0≤t≤T
|x˜j(t)− l˜j(t)|2 ≤ K11
N
. (44)
Lemma 25 Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA), there exists a
constant K12 independent of N such that
sup
0≤j≤N,j 6=i
E sup
0≤t≤T
|δxj(t)|2 ≤ K12
N2
. (45)
PROOF. By the equations of δx0, δxi, δxj and Gron-
wall’s inequality, we have
E sup
0≤s≤t
|δx0(s)|2 ≤ KE
∫ t
0
|δx(N)|2ds,
and
sup
1≤j≤N,j 6=i
E sup
0≤s≤t
|δxj(s)|2 ≤ KE
∫ t
0
|δx(N)|2ds,
and
E sup
0≤s≤t
|δxi(s)|2 ≤ K +KE
∫ t
0
|δx(N)|2ds.
It is easy to check that
d
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
δxj
)
=
[
A
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
δxj
)
+
1
N
Bδui + Fδx
(N)
]
dt
+
1
N
N∑
j=1
[
Cδxj + F˜ δx
(N) + G˜δx0
]
dWj .
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to |∑Nj=1 δxj |2, we have
E
∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
j=1
δxj
∣∣∣2
≤KE
∫ t
0
∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
j=1
δxj
∣∣∣2 + 1
N2
|δui|2ds
+
1
N2
N∑
j=1
E
∫ t
0
[
Cδxj + F˜ δx
(N) + G˜δx0
]2
ds
≤KE
∫ t
0
∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
j=1
δxj
∣∣∣2 + K
N2
.
Moreover, we have
E sup
0≤t≤T
|δx0(t)|2 ≤ K
N2
,
and
sup
1≤j≤N,j 6=i
E sup
0≤t≤T
|δxj(t)|2 ≤ K
N2
. ✷
Lemma 26 Under (H1)-(H3) and (SA), there exist con-
stants K13, K14, K15 independent of N such that
E sup
0≤t≤T
|x∗∗(t)− δx−(0,i)(t)|2 ≤ K13
N
, (46)
and
E sup
0≤t≤T
|x∗0(t)−Nδx0(t)|2 ≤
K14
N
, (47)
and
E sup
0≤t≤T
|x∗j (t)−Nδxj(t)|2 ≤
K15
N
. (48)
PROOF. First, we have the following dynamics
d(x∗∗ − δx−(0,i))
=
[
(A+ F )(x∗∗ − δx−(0,i)) + 1
N
(Fδxi + δx−(0,i))
]
dt
−
∑
j 6=i
[
Cδxj + F˜ δx
(N) + G˜δx0
]
dWj ,
13
d(x∗0 −Nδx0)
=
[
A0(x
∗
0 −Nδx0) + F0(x∗∗ − δx−(0,i))
]
dt
+
[
C0(x
∗
0 −Nδx0) + F˜0(x∗∗ − δx−(0,i))
]
dW0,
d(x∗j −Nδxj)
=
[
A(x∗j −Nδxj) + F (x∗∗ − δx−(0,i))
]
dt
+
[
C(x∗j −Nδxj) + F˜ (x∗∗ − δx−(0,i))
+ G˜(x∗0 −Nδx0)
]
dWj .
Therefore, it follows from Burkholder-Davis-Gundy in-
equality that
E sup
0≤s≤t
|x∗∗(s)− δx−(0,i)(s)|2
≤KE
∫ t
0
[
|x∗∗(s)− δx−(0,i)(s)|2 + 1
N2
|Fδxi + δx−(0,i)|2
]
ds
+KE sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣∣∑
j 6=i
∫ s
0
(δxj + δx
(N) + δx0)dWj
∣∣∣2
≤KE
∫ t
0
|x∗∗(s)− δx−(0,i)(s)|2ds
+KE
∫ t
0
[ 1
N2
|Fδxi + δx−(0,i)|2 +
∑
j 6=i
|δxj |2 + |δx(N)|2
+ |δx0|2
]
ds.
It then follows from Gronwall’s inequality and Lemma
25 that
E sup
0≤t≤T
|x∗∗(t)− δx−(0,i)(t)|2 ≤ K
N
.
Similarly, we have (47) and (48). ✷
6.2.3 Asymptotic optimality
In order to prove asymptotic optimality for the minor
agents, it suffices to consider the perturbations u−0 ∈
U−0 such that J (N)soc (u˜0, u−0) ≤ J (N)soc (u˜0, u˜−0). It is easy
to check that
J (N)soc (u˜0, u˜−0) ≤ KN,
where K is a constant independent of N . Therefore, in
what follows, we only consider the perturbations u−0 ∈
U−0 satisfying
N∑
j=1
E
∫ T
0
|uj|2dt ≤ KN.
Let δui = ui − u˜i, and consider a perturbation u =
u˜+ (0, δu1, · · · , δuN) := u˜+ δu. Then by Section 6.2.1,
we have
2J (N)soc (u˜+ δu)
=〈M2(u˜+ δu), u˜+ δu〉+ 2〈M1, u˜+ δu〉+M0
=2J (N)soc (u˜) + 2
N∑
i=1
〈M2u˜+M1, δui〉+ 〈M2δu, δu〉,
(49)
where 〈M2u˜+M1, δui〉 is the Fre´chet differential of J (N)soc
on u˜ with variation δui. It follows from Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality that
J (N)soc (u˜ + δu)− J (N)soc (u˜)
≥−
√√√√ N∑
i=1
‖M2u˜+M1‖2
N∑
i=1
‖δui‖2 + 1
2
〈M2δu, δu〉
≥ − ‖M2u˜+M1‖O(N).
(50)
Therefore, in order to prove asymptotic optimality for
the minor agents, we only need to show that
‖M2u˜+M1‖ = o(1).
We need to introduce another assumption on the con-
vergence of solutions of BSDEs:
(H4) There exists constants L1, L2 > 0 independent of
N such that
E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣E[y11 |FW0t ]− 1N ∑
j 6=i
y
j
1
∣∣∣2dt ≤ L1
N
, (51)
and
E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣E[β111 |FW0t ]− 1N ∑
j 6=i
β
jj
1
∣∣∣2dt ≤ L2
N
. (52)
Theorem 27 Under (H1)-(H4) and (SA), (Λ1,Λ2) of
(26) is a 1√
N
-optimal strategy for the minor agents.
PROOF. From Section 6.2.2, we have
〈M2u˜+M1, δui〉
=E
∫ T
0
[
〈Ql˜i, δli〉 − 〈S, δli〉+ 〈Ru˜i, δui〉
]
dt+
15∑
l=1
εl.
From the optimality of u˜, we have
E
∫ T
0
[
〈Ql˜i, δli〉 − 〈S, δli〉+ 〈Ru˜i, δui〉
]
dt = 0.
Moreover, it follows from Lemma 14-26 that
10∑
l=1
εl + ε14 + ε15 = O
( 1√
N
)
.
Therefore,
‖M2u˜+M1‖ = O
( 1√
N
)
. ✷
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Remark 28 Note that
d
( 1
N
∑
j 6=i
x˜j − E[x˜1|FW0t ]
)
=
[
(A+BΛ1)
( 1
N
∑
j 6=i
x˜j − E[x˜1|FW0t ]
)
+F x˜(N)
− FE[x˜(N)|FW0t ]
]
dt
+
1
N
∑
j 6=i
[
(C+DΛ1)x˜j+DΛ2+F˜x
(N)+G˜x˜0
]
dWj ,
Therefore, it follows from Burkholder-Davis-Gundy in-
equality and Gronwall’s inequality that
E sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣∣ 1
N
∑
j 6=i
x˜j(s)− E[x˜1|FW0s ]
∣∣∣2 ≤ K
N
.
If C = 0, applying Itoˆ’s formula to
∣∣ 1
N
∑
j 6=i y
j
1 −
E[y11 |FW0t ]
∣∣2, it is easy to check that (51) in (H4) holds.
Remark 29 If the state has the following form
dx0 =
[
A0x0 +B0u0 + F0x
(N)
]
dt
+
[
C0x0 +D0u0 + F˜0x
(N)
]
dW0,
x0(0) = ξ0 ∈ Rn,
and for 1 ≤ i ≤ N,{
dxi =
[
Axi +Bui + Fx
(N) +Gx0
]
dt+DdWi,
xi(0) = ξ ∈ Rn.
Assumption (H4) is not needed to obtain the asymptotic
optimality of the minor agents. However, if the state
equations of the minor agents take the form (2), we need
to suppose the assumption (H4) hold and we will continue
to study this in the future work.
References
[1] Giacomo Albi, Young-Pil Choi, Massimo Fornasier, and
Dante Kalise. Mean field control hierarchy. Applied
Mathematics & Optimization, 76(1):93–135, 2017.
[2] Jalal Arabneydi and Aditya Mahajan. Team-optimal solution
of finite number of mean-field coupled lqg subsystems. In
2015 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC),
pages 5308–5313. IEEE, 2015.
[3] Alain Bensoussan, KCJ Sung, Sheung Chi Phillip Yam, and
Siu-Pang Yung. Linear-quadratic mean field games. Journal
of Optimization Theory and Applications, 169(2):496–529,
2016.
[4] Rainer Buckdahn, Juan Li, and Shige Peng. Nonlinear
stochastic differential games involving a major player and
a large number of collectively acting minor agents. SIAM
Journal on Control and Optimization, 52(1):451–492, 2014.
[5] Rene´ Carmona and Franc¸ois Delarue. Probabilistic analysis
of mean-field games. SIAM Journal on Control and
Optimization, 51(4):2705–2734, 2013.
[6] Yue Chen, Ana Busˇic´, and Sean P Meyn. State estimation
for the individual and the population in mean field control
with application to demand dispatch. IEEE Transactions on
Automatic Control, 62(3):1138–1149, 2016.
[7] Peter R de Waal and Jan H van Schuppen. A class of team
problems with discrete action spaces: Optimality conditions
based on multimodularity. SIAM Journal on Control and
Optimization, 38(3):875–892, 2000.
[8] Ying Hu, Jianhui Huang, and Xun Li. Linear quadratic
mean field game with control input constraint. ESAIM:
Control, Optimisation and Calculus of Variations, 24(2):901–
919, 2018.
[9] Ying Hu, Jianhui Huang, and Tianyang
Nie. Linear-quadratic-gaussian mixed mean-field games with
heterogeneous input constraints. SIAM Journal on Control
and Optimization, 56(4):2835–2877, 2018.
[10] Jianhui Huang, Shujun Wang, and Zhen Wu. Backward
mean-field linear-quadratic-gaussian (lqg) games: Full and
partial information. IEEE Transactions on Automatic
Control, 61(12):3784–3796, 2016.
[11] Minyi Huang. Large-population lqg games involving a major
player: the nash certainty equivalence principle. SIAM
Journal on Control and Optimization, 48(5):3318–3353, 2010.
[12] Minyi Huang, Peter E Caines, and Roland P Malhame´.
Large-population cost-coupled lqg problems with nonuniform
agents: individual-mass behavior and decentralized ε-nash
equilibria. IEEE transactions on automatic control,
52(9):1560–1571, 2007.
[13] Minyi Huang, Peter E Caines, and Roland P Malhame´.
Social optima in mean field lqg control: centralized and
decentralized strategies. IEEE Transactions on Automatic
Control, 57(7):1736–1751, 2012.
[14] Minyi Huang and Son Luu Nguyen. Linear-quadratic mean
field social optimization with a major player. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1904.03346, 2019.
[15] Jean-Michel Lasry and Pierre-Louis Lions. Mean field games.
Japanese journal of mathematics, 2(1):229–260, 2007.
[16] Jun Moon and Tamer Bas¸ar. Discrete-time lqg mean
field games with unreliable communication. In 53rd IEEE
Conference on Decision and Control, pages 2697–2702. IEEE,
2014.
[17] Jun Moon and Tamer Bas¸ar. Risk-sensitive mean field games
via the stochastic maximum principle. Dynamic Games and
Applications, pages 1–26, 2018.
[18] Mojtaba Nourian and Peter E Caines. -nash mean field
game theory for nonlinear stochastic dynamical systems with
major and minor agents. SIAM Journal on Control and
Optimization, 51(4):3302–3331, 2013.
[19] Galo Nun˜o and Benjamin Moll. Social optima in economies
with heterogeneous agents. Review of Economic Dynamics,
28:150–180, 2018.
[20] Etienne Pardoux and Shanjian Tang. Forward-backward
stochastic differential equations and quasilinear parabolic
pdes. Probability Theory and Related Fields, 114(2):123–150,
1999.
[21] Benedetto Piccoli, Francesco Rossi, and Emmanuel Tre´lat.
Control to flocking of the kinetic cucker–smale model. SIAM
Journal on Mathematical Analysis, 47(6):4685–4719, 2015.
[22] Jingrui Sun, Xun Li, and Jiongmin Yong. Open-loop
and closed-loop solvabilities for stochastic linear quadratic
15
optimal control problems. SIAM Journal on Control and
Optimization, 54(5):2274–2308, 2016.
[23] Bing-Chang Wang and Jianhui Huang. Social optima in
robust mean field lqg control. In 2017 11th Asian Control
Conference (ASCC), pages 2089–2094. IEEE, 2017.
[24] Bing-Chang Wang and Ji-Feng Zhang. Social optima in mean
field linear-quadratic-gaussian models with markov jump
parameters. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization,
55(1):429–456, 2017.
[25] David WK Yeung and Leon A Petrosjan. Cooperative
stochastic differential games. Springer Science & Business
Media, 2006.
[26] Jiongmin Yong and Xun Yu Zhou. Stochastic controls:
Hamiltonian systems and HJB equations, volume 43.
Springer Science & Business Media, 1999.
A Appendix: Discounting method
For any given (Y, Z)∈L2F (0, T ;Rm)×L2F (0, T ;Rm×(d+1))
and 0 ≤ t ≤ T , the following SDE has a unique solution:
X(t) =x+
∫ t
0
b(s,X(s),E[X(s)|FW0s ], Y (s), Z(s))ds
+
∫ t
0
σ(s,X(s),E[X(s)|FW0s ],Y (s), Z(s))dW (s).
(A.1)
Therefore, we can introduce a map M1 : (Y, Z) ∈
L2F(0, T ;R
m)×L2F(0, T ;Rm×(d+1))→X ∈ L2F(0, T ;Rn)
by (A.1). Moreover, we have the following result:
Lemma 30 Let Xi be the solution of (A.1) correspond-
ing to (Yi, Zi), i = 1, 2 respectively. Then for all ρ ∈ R
and some constant l1 > 0, we have
Ee−ρt|Xˆ(t)|2 + ρ¯1E
∫ t
0
e−ρs|Xˆ(s)|2ds
≤(k2l1 + k211)E
∫ t
0
e−ρs|Yˆ (s)|2ds
+ (k3l2 + k
2
12)E
∫ t
0
e−ρs|Zˆ(s)|2ds,
(A.2)
and
Ee−ρt|Xˆ(t)|2 ≤ (k2l1 + k211)E
∫ t
0
e−ρ¯1(t−s)−ρs|Yˆ (s)|2ds
+ (k2l2 + k
2
12)E
∫ t
0
e−ρ¯1(t−s)−ρs|Zˆ(s)|2ds,
(A.3)
where ρ¯1 = ρ− 2ρ1− 2k1− k2l−11 − k3l−12 − k29 − k210 and
Φˆ = Φ1 − Φ2, Φ = X,Y, Z. Moreover,
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt|Xˆ(t)|2dt
≤1− e
−ρ¯1T
ρ¯1
[
(k2l1 + k
2
11)E
∫ t
0
e−ρt|Yˆ (t)|2dt
+ (k3l2 + k
2
12)E
∫ t
0
e−ρt|Zˆ(t)|2dt
]
,
(A.4)
and
e−ρTE|Xˆ(T )|2 ≤ (1 ∨ e−ρ¯1T )
[
(k2l1 + k
2
11)E
∫ T
0
e−ρt|Yˆ (t)|2dt
+ (k3l2 + k
2
12)E
∫ T
0
e−ρt|Zˆ(t)|2dt
]
.
(A.5)
Specifically, if ρ¯1 > 0,
e−ρTE|Xˆ(T )|2 ≤ (k2l1 + k211)E
∫ T
0
e−ρt|Yˆ (t)|2dt
+ (k3l2 + k
2
12)E
∫ T
0
e−ρt|Zˆ(t)|2dt.
(A.6)
PROOF. For any ρ > 0, applying Itoˆ’s formula to
e−ρt|Xˆ(t)|2,
Ee−ρt|Xˆ(t)|2 + ρE
∫ t
0
e−ρs|Xˆ(s)|2ds
=2E
∫ t
0
e−ρsXˆ(s)(b(s,X1(s),E[X1(s)|FW0s ], Y1(s), Z1(s))
− b(s,X2(s),E[X2(s)|FW0s ], Y2(s), Z2(s)))ds
+ E
∫ t
0
e−ρs(σ(s,X1(s),E[X1(s)|FW0s ], Y1(s), Z1(s))
− σ(s,X2(s),E[X2(s)|FW0s ], Y2(s), Z2(s)))2ds
≤E
∫ t
0
e−ρs
[
(2ρ1 + 2k1 + k2l
−1
1 + k3l
−1
2 + k
2
9 + k
2
10)|Xˆ(s)|2
+ (k2l1 + k
2
11)|Yˆ (s)|2 + (k3l2 + k212)|Zˆ(s)|2
]
ds.
Similarly, applying Itoˆ’s formula to e−ρ¯1(t−s)−ρs|Xˆ(s)|2,
we have (A.3). Integrating from 0 to T on both sides of
(A.3) and noting that
1− e−ρ¯1(t−s)
ρ¯1
≤ 1− e
−ρ¯1T
ρ¯1
,
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we have
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt|Xˆ(t)|2dt
≤(k2l1 + k211)E
∫ T
0
∫ t
0
e−ρ¯1(t−s)−ρs|Yˆ (s)|2dsdt
+ (k3l2 + k
2
12)E
∫ T
0
∫ t
0
e−ρ¯1(t−s)−ρs|Zˆ(s)|2dsdt
=(k2l1 + k
2
11)E
∫ T
0
1− e−ρ¯1(t−s)−ρs
ρ¯1
e−ρs|Yˆ (s)|2ds
+ (k3l2 + k
2
12)E
∫ T
0
1− e−ρ¯1(t−s)−ρs
ρ¯1
e−ρs|Zˆ(s)|2ds
≤(k2l1 + k211)
1− e−ρ¯1T
ρ¯1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρs|Yˆ (s)|2ds
+ (k3l2 + k
2
12)
1 − e−ρ¯1T
ρ¯1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρs|Zˆ(s)|2ds.
Letting t = T in (A.3), we have (A.5). ✷
For any given X ∈ L2F(0, T ;Rn), the following BSDE
has a unique solution:
Y (t) =
∫ T
t
f(s,X(s),E[X(s)|FW0s ], Y (s),E[Y (s)|FW0s ],
Z(s),E[Z(s)|FW0s ])ds−
∫ T
t
Z(s)dW (s).
(A.7)
Thus, we can introduce another map M2 : X ∈
L2F(0,T ;R
n)→(Y, Z) ∈ L2F(0, T ;Rm)×L2F(0,T ;Rm×(d+1))
by (A.7). Similarly, we have the following result:
Lemma 31 Let (Yi, Zi) be the solution of (A.7) corre-
sponding to Xi, i = 1, 2, respectively. Then for all ρ ∈ R
and some constants l3, l4, l5, l6 > 0 such that
Ee−ρt|Yˆ (t)|2 + ρ¯2E
∫ T
t
e−ρs|Yˆ (s)|2ds
+ (1− k7l5 − k8l6)E
∫ T
t
e−ρs|Zˆ(s)|2ds
≤(k4l3 + k5l4)E
∫ T
t
e−ρs|Xˆ(s)|2ds,
(A.8)
and
Ee−ρt|Yˆ (t)|2 + (1− k7l5 − k8l6)E
∫ T
t
e−ρs|Zˆ(s)|2ds
≤(k4l3 + k5l4)E
∫ T
t
e−ρ¯2(s−t)−ρs|Xˆ(s)|2ds,
(A.9)
where ρ¯2 = −ρ−2ρ2−2k6−k4l−13 −k5l−14 −k7l−15 −k8l−16 ,
and Φˆ = Φ1 − Φ2, Φ = X,Y, Z. Moreover,
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt|Yˆ (t)|2dt
≤1− e
−ρ¯2T
ρ¯2
(k4l3 + k5l4)E
∫ T
0
e−ρs|Xˆ(s)|2ds,
(A.10)
and
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt|Zˆ(t)|2dt
≤ (k4l3 + k5l4)(1 ∨ e
−ρ¯2T )
(1− k7l5 − k8l6)(1 ∧ e−ρ¯2T )E
∫ T
0
e−ρs|Xˆ(s)|2ds.
(A.11)
Specifically, if ρ¯2 > 0,
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt|Zˆ(t)|2dt ≤ k4l3 + k5l4
1− k7l5 − k8l6E
∫ T
0
e−ρs|Xˆ(s)|2ds.
(A.12)
Proof of Theorem 10: DefineM :=M2 ◦M1, where
M1 is defined by (A.1) andM2 is defined by (A.7). Thus,
M is a mapping fromL2F(0, T ;Rm)×L2F(0, T ;Rm×(d+1))
into itself. For (Ui,Vi)∈L2F (0,T ;Rm)×L2F (0,T ;Rm×(d+1)),
let Xi :=M1(Ui, Vi) and (Yi, Zi) := M(Ui, Vi). There-
fore,
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt|Y1(t)− Y2(t)|2dt+ E
∫ T
0
e−ρt|Z1(t)− Z2(t)|2dt
≤
[1− e−ρ¯2T
ρ¯2
+
1 ∨ e−ρ¯2T
(1− k7l5 − k8l6)(1 ∧ e−ρ¯2T )
]
(k4l3 + k5l4)
× E
∫ T
0
e−ρt|X1(t)−X2(t)|2dt
≤
[1− e−ρ¯2T
ρ¯2
+
1 ∨ e−ρ¯2T
(1− k7l5 − k8l6)(1 ∧ e−ρ¯2T )
]1− e−ρ¯1T
ρ¯1
× (k4l3 + k5l4)
[
(k2l1 + k
2
11)E
∫ T
0
e−ρt|U1(t)− U2(t)|2dt
+ (k3l2 + k
2
12)E
∫ T
0
e−ρt|V1(t)− V2(t)|2dt
]
.
Choosing suitable ρ, we get that M is a contraction
mapping.
Furthermore, if 2ρ1+2ρ2 < −2k1−2k6−2k27−2k28−k29−
k210, we can choose ρ ∈ R, 0 < k7l5 < 12 and 0 < k8l6 < 12
and sufficient large l1, l2, l3, l4 such that
ρ¯1 > 0, ρ¯2 > 0, 1− k7l5 − k8l6 > 0.
Therefore,
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt|Y1(t)− Y2(t)|2dt+ E
∫ T
0
e−ρt|Z1(t)− Z2(t)|2dt
≤
[ 1
ρ¯2
+
1
1− k7l5 − k8l6
] 1
ρ¯1
(k4l3 + k5l4)
×
[
(k2l1 + k
2
11)E
∫ T
0
e−ρt|U1(t)− U2(t)|2dt
+ (k3l2 + k
2
12)E
∫ T
0
e−ρt|V1(t)− V2(t)|2dt
]
.
The proof is complete. ✷
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